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People tend to slow down after they make an error. This phenomenon, generally referred to
as post–error slowing, has been hypothesized to reflect perceptual distraction, time wasted on
irrelevant processes, a priori bias against the response made in error, increased variability in
a priori bias, or an increase in response caution. Although the response caution interpretation
has dominated the empirical literature, little research has attempted to test this interpretation in
the context of a formal process model. Here we used the drift diffusion model to isolate and
identify the psychological processes responsible for post–error slowing. In a lexical decision
data set comprised of 1,094,886 responses we found that post-error slowing was associated
with an increase in response caution and—to a lesser extent—a change in response bias. In
the present data set, we found no evidence that post–error slowing is caused by perceptual
distraction or time wasted on irrelevant processes. These results support a response monitoring
account of post–error slowing.
Keywords: Response caution, Response time distributions, Diffusion model decomposition,
Lexical decision.
What does a man do after he makes an error?1 This ques-
tion is just a valid as when it was first articulated by Rabbitt
and Rodgers (1977) over 30 years ago. One answer to this
question is that, after he has made an erroneous decision,
a man slows down on his next decision—an empirical reg-
ularity known as post–error slowing (PES; Laming, 1968,
1979b, 1979a; Rabbitt, 1966, 1979; Rabbitt & Rodgers,
1977). However, this answer raises a new and more inter-
esting question, namely, why does a man slow down after he
makes an error? Various answers have been proposed and
one of the main goals of this article is to implement these an-
swers in a formal model of decision making so as to compare
their adequacy in a precise and quantitative fashion.
The competing explanations for PES, detailed in the next
section, are (1) increased response caution; (2) a priori bias
away from the response that was just made in error; (3) an
overall decrease in the across-trial variability of a priori bias;
(4) distraction of attention; (5) delayed startup due to irrele-
vant processes (e.g., overcoming disappointment). We pro-
pose that these five explanations map on uniquely to parame-
ters in a drift diffusion model for response time (RT) and ac-
curacy (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). This one-
to-one mapping between psychological processes and model
parameters allows an informative diffusion model decom-
position of PES and a rigorous assessment of the extent to
which each explanation (or indeed any combination of them)
holds true.
A major practical obstacle that we needed to overcome
is that the drift diffusion model requires relatively many ob-
servations to produce informative parameter estimates; as a
rule of thumb, the model requires at least 10 error RTs in
each experimental condition. Because the interest here cen-
ters on trials that follow an error, this means that the model
requires at least 10 errors that immediately follow an error.
With an error rate of 5% throughout, the minimum number
of observations is already 4,000. Thus, a reliable diffusion
model decomposition of PES requires a relatively large data
set. Here we fit the model to a lexical decision data set fea-
turing 39 participants who each completed 28,074 trials for a
1 For historical reasons we use the word “man” instead of “per-
son”, even though the latter is slightly more accurate and much
more politically correct.
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grand total of 1,094,886 trials (Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New,
2010).
In the next sections we briefly discuss the different expla-
nations for PES and formalize these predictions in the con-
text of the drift diffusion model. We then test the different
explanations by fitting the model to the lexical decision data
from Keuleers, Brysbaert, and New (2010). To the best of
our knowledge, this is the second time that competing ex-
planations for PES are tested in the framework of a formal
model of decision making. The first study, due toWhite, Rat-
cliff, Vasey, and McKoon (2010b), also presented a diffusion
model decomposition of PES—the differences and similari-
ties between our study and that of White et al. (2010b) are
analyzed in the final section.
Explanations for Post–Error
Slowing
Over the years, several explanations have been proposed
to account for PES. The first explanation (i.e., increased re-
sponse caution) is that an error prompts people to accumu-
late more information before they initiate a decision. The
underlying idea is that people can adaptively change their
response thresholds—becoming slightly less cautious after
a correct response, and more cautious after an error—and
thereby self–regulate to an optimal state of homeostasis char-
acterized by fast responses and few errors (e.g., Botvinick,
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Cohen, Botvinick,
& Carter, 2000; Brewer & Smith, 1989; Fitts, 1966; Rab-
bitt & Rodgers, 1977; Smith & Brewer, 1995; Vickers &
Lee, 1998). This explanation is so appealing that it is of-
ten assumed to be correct without further testing. That is,
PES is often interpreted as a direct measure of cognitive
control. Conclusions about cognitive control are then based
on associations between PES and physiological measures
such as anterior cingulate activity (Li, Huang, Constable, &
Sinha, 2006; Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer,
& Ullsperger, 2011), error–related negativity (ERN) and pos-
itivity (Pe, Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003), or cortisol
levels (Tops & Boksem, 2010). Alternatively, conclusions
about cognitive control may be based on a comparison of
PES between clinical groups (e.g., Shiels & Hawk, 2010).
The second explanation (i.e., a priori bias) is that people
become negatively biased against the response option that
was just executed in error (e.g., Laming, 1968, 1979b; Rab-
bitt & Rodgers, 1977). This implies that errors facilitate
response alternations and hinder response repetitions, both
with respect to response speed and probability of occurrence.
The third explanation (i.e., decreased variability in bias)
is that, following an error, people might wait a little longer
before they start to accumulate stimulus–related information.
The idea, first promoted by Laming (1968, 1979a), is that in
speeded RT tasks people often start to sample information
from the display even before the stimulus is presented. This
advance sampling of stimulus–unrelated information induces
trial-to-trial variability in a priori bias. This variability may
cause fast errors, and therefore a cautious participant starts
the evidence accumulation process only after stimulus onset.
The fourth explanation (i.e., distraction of attention) is
that the occurrence of an error is an infrequent, surprising
event that distracts participants during the processing of the
subsequent stimulus (Notebaert et al., 2009). Thus, the error-
induced distraction contaminates the process of evidence ac-
cumulation.
The fifth explanation (i.e., delayed startup) is that errors
delay the start of evidence accumulation on the next trial—
for instance, participants might need time after an error to
re-assess their own performance level and to overcome dis-
appointment (Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977).
In the literature, the first explanation of PES (i.e., in-
creased response caution) has always been the most domi-
nant. However, Rabbitt (1966, p. 272) already concluded
that “the present data do not allow a choice between possi-
ble explanations”. Other studies did not test the competing
explanations in a rigorous and quantitative manner (but see
White et al., 2010b). Here we set out to test the above five
explanations in the context of what is arguably the most pop-
ular and successful model for response times and accuracy,
the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff &McKoon,
2008).
A Drift Diffusion Model
Decomposition of Response
Times
In the analysis of speeded two–choice tasks, performance
is usually summarized by mean RT and proportion correct.
Although concise, this summary ignores important aspects
of the data and makes it difficult to draw conclusions about
the underlying cognitive processes that drive performance
(Wagenmakers, Van der Maas, & Grasman, 2007). A more
detailed and more informative analysis takes into account the
entire RT distributions for both correct and error responses,
in addition to proportion correct. These RT distributions can
be analyzed with the help of formal models — here we focus
on the drift diffusion model.
The drift diffusion model has been successfully applied
to a wide range of experimental tasks including brightness
discrimination, letter identification, lexical decision, recog-
nition memory, signal detection and the implicit association
test (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004;
Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2006; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff,
Gomez, & McKoon, 2008; Dutilh, Vandekerckhove, Tuer-
linckx, & Wagenmakers, 2009; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon,
2010; Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007;
Van Ravenzwaaij, Van der Maas, & Wagenmakers, in press).
In these tasks and others, the model has been used to de-
compose the behavioral effects of phenomena such as prac-
tice (Dutilh et al., 2009; Dutilh, Krypotos, & Wagenmakers,
in press; Petrov, Horn, & Ratcliff, in press), aging (Ratcliff,
Thapar, & McKoon, 2001; Ratcliff et al., 2006, 2010), psy-
chological disorders (White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon,
2009, 2010a; White et al., 2010b), sleep deprivation (Ratcliff
& Van Dongen, 2009), intelligence (Ratcliff, Schmiedek, &
McKoon, 2008; Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Suss, &
Wittmann, 2007; Van Ravenzwaaij, Brown, & Wagenmak-
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ers, in press), and so forth.
The success of the drift diffusion model is due to several
factors. First, the drift diffusion model takes into account not
just mean RT but considers entire RT distributions for correct
and error responses; second, the drift diffusion model gener-
ally provides an excellent fit to observed data with relatively
few parameters free to vary; third, the drift diffusion model
accounts for all current benchmark phenomena (Brown &
Heathcote, 2008); fourth, the model allows researchers to
decompose observed performance into constituent cognitive
processes of interest; fifth, the model has passed several tests
of selective influence and this increases one’s confidence that
the model parameters represent the intended cognitive pro-
cess (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004; Ratcliff & Rouder,
1998; Wagenmakers et al., 2008); finally, the drift diffusion
model has been linked to the dynamics of neural firing rates,
providing some insight as to how a diffusion process might
be implemented in the brain (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Addi-
tional advantages (and limitations) of a diffusion model anal-
ysis are discussed in more detail in Wagenmakers (2009).
Here we briefly introduce the drift diffusion model as it
applies to the lexical decision task, a task where participants
have to decide quickly whether a presented letter string is a
word (e.g., party) or a nonword (e.g., drapa). The core of the
model is the Wiener diffusion process that describes how the
relative evidence for one of two response alternatives accu-
mulates over time. The meandering lines in Figure 1 illus-
trate the continuous accumulation of noisy evidence follow-
ing the presentation of a word stimulus. When the amount of
diagnostic evidence for one of the response options reaches a
predetermined response threshold (i.e., one of the horizontal
boundaries in Figure 1), the corresponding response is initi-
ated. The dark line in Figure 1 shows how the noise inherent
in the accumulation process can sometimes cause the process
to end up at the wrong (i.e., nonword) response boundary.
The standard version of the drift diffusion model decom-
poses RTs and proportion correct in seven different parame-
ters:
1. Mean drift rate (v). Drift rate quantifies rate of
information–accumulation from the stimulus. This
means that when the absolute value of drift rate is high,
decisions are fast and accurate; thus, v relates to task
difficulty or subject ability.
2. Across–trial variability in drift rate (). This parameter
reflects the fact that drift rate may fluctuate from one
trial to the next, according to a normal distribution with
mean v and standard deviation . The parameter  al-
lows the drift diffusion model to account for data in
which error responses are systematically slower than
correct responses (Ratcliff, 1978).
3. Boundary separation (a). Boundary separation quantifies
response caution and modulates the speed–accuracy
tradeoff: At the price of an increase in RT, participants
can decrease their error rate by widening the boundary
separation (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2008).
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Figure 1. The drift diffusion model as it applies to the lexical de-
cision task. A word stimulus is presented (not shown) and two ex-
ample sample paths represent the accumulation of evidence which
result in one correct response (light line) and one error response
(dark line). Repeated application of the diffusion process yields his-
tograms of both correct responses (upper histogram) and incorrect
responses (lower histogram). As is evident from the histograms,
the correct, upper word boundary is reached more often than the
incorrect, lower nonword boundary. The total RT consists of the
sum of a decision component, modeled by the noisy accumulation
of evidence, and a non–decision component that represents the time
needed for processes such as stimulus encoding and response exe-
cution.
4. Mean starting point (z). Starting point reflects the a priori
bias of a participant for one or the other response. This
parameter is usually manipulated via payoff or propor-
tion manipulations (Edwards, 1965; Wagenmakers et
al., 2008; but see Diederich & Busemeyer, 2006). Of-
ten, z is reported as a proportion of boundary separa-
tion a and referred to as bias B.
5. Across–trial variability in starting point (sz). This param-
eter reflects the fact that starting point may fluctuate
from one trial to the next, according to a uniform dis-
tribution with mean z and range sz. The parameter sz
also allows the drift diffusion model to account for data
in which error responses are systematically faster than
correct responses. Analogous to the transformation of
z to B, sz is often transformed to sB.
6. Mean of the non–decision component of processing (Ter).
This parameter encompasses the time spent on com-
mon processes, i.e., processes executed irrespective
of the decision process. The drift diffusion model
assumes that the observed RT is the sum of the
non–decision component and the decision component
(Luce, 1986):
RT = DT + Ter; (1)
4GILLESDUTILH1, JOACHIMVANDEKERCKHOVE2, BIRTEU. FORSTMANN1, EMMANUELKEULEERS3, MARCBRYSBAERT3, ANDERIC–JANWAGENMAKERS1
where DT denotes decision time. Therefore, non–
decision time Ter does not affect response choice and
acts solely to shift the entire RT distribution.
7. Across–trial variability in the non–decision component of
processing (st). This parameter reflects the fact that
non–decision time may fluctuate from one trial to the
next, according to a uniform distribution with mean Ter
and range st. The parameter st also allows the model to
capture RT distributions that show a relatively shallow
rise in the leading edge.
From Process to Parameter: A
Drift Diffusion Model
Perspective on Post–Error
Slowing
Many recent applications of the drift diffusion model have
been exploratory in nature; for instance, researchers have
used the drift diffusion model to study the psychological
processes that change with practice (Dutilh et al., 2009, in
press), sleep–deprivation (Ratcliff & Van Dongen, 2009), hy-
poglycemia (Geddes et al., in press), and dysphoria (White et
al., 2009, 2010a), but this work was seldom guided by strong
prior expectations and theories. This is different in the case
of PES, perhaps because explanations for PES have origi-
nated in part from a framework of sequential information
processing (e.g., Laming, 1979a). Therefore, the competing
explanations for PES—in terms of the cognitive processes
that change after an error—can be mapped selectively to dif-
ferent parameters in the drift diffusion model, as is shown in
Figure 2.
Thus, the cognitive process explanation of increased re-
sponse caution maps onto an increase in boundary separa-
tion a; the explanation of a priori bias corresponds to a shift
in starting point z away from the boundary that was just
reached in error2; the explanation of decreased variability
in bias translates to a decrease in across-trial variability sz;
the explanation of distraction of attention entails a decrease
in mean drift rate v; and, finally, the explanation of delayed
startup is associated with an increase in mean non–decision
time Ter. The unique link between process and parameter
means that competing explanations for PES can be rigorously
tested in any particular paradigm, as long as the drift diffu-
sion model applies and the data set is sufficiently large. In
the context of PES, the latter concern is particularly acute.
Method
The present data set was originally collected to validate
a new measure for word frequency (i.e., SUBTLEX–NL;
Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010). Each of 39 partici-
pants contributed 28,074 lexical decisions for a grand total
of 1,094,886 decisions. Half of the stimuli were uniquely
presented words and the other half were uniquely presented
nonwords. The word stimuli were selected from the CELEX
database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Van Rijn, 1993) and the
nonword stimuli were created with the Wuggy pseudoword
generator (Keuleers & Brysbaert, 2010).
The experiment was presented in blocks of 500 trials with
a self–paced break after every 100 trials. Each trial started
with a 500 ms fixation period. The stimulus was then pre-
sented until the participant responded, up to a maximum of
2000 ms. A new trial started 500 ms after the response. Par-
ticipants received feedback about their accuracy after each
block of 500 trials. Importantly, participants did not re-
ceive trial–by–trial feedback concerning errors. This means
that any post–error effects are not contaminated by the pos-
sibly distracting presence of error feedback. A more de-
tailed description of the experimental methods is presented in
Keuleers, Brysbaert, and New (2010) and Keuleers, Diepen-
daele, and Brysbaert (2010).
The enormous amount of lexical decision trials in this
data set contains a commensurate amount of errors; across
all participants, 118,566 trials (i.e., 10.80%) were made in
error. This abundance of errors allowed us to examine the
explanations for PES across various conditions. Specifically,
we were able to compare post–error effects separately for
nonword stimuli and for word stimuli of varying word fre-
quencies.3 That is, we used word frequency (based on SUB-
TLEX) to divide all words into six equally large bins, the five
cut points being 0.11, 0.48, 1.33, 3.73, and 14.16 occurrences
per million.
Results
Below we first discuss the effects of errors on observed
performance, that is, RT and proportion correct. Next, we fit
the drift diffusion model to the data and discuss the effects of
errors on the latent psychological processes hypothesized to
explain PES.4
Post–Error Effects on Observed Data
The different hypotheses about PES entail effects on
RT, effects on proportion correct, or a combination of the
two. It is therefore informative to show—both for post–
error trials and post–correct trials, and for different stimulus
categories—entire distributions of RT for correct and error
responses, together with proportion correct. A convenient
tool to paint this multivariate picture is the quantile proba-
bility plot (e.g., Ratcliff, 2002). Figure 3 shows a quantile
probability plot for the data from Keuleers, Brysbaert, and
New (2010), based on averaging RT quantiles and propor-
tions across individual participants.
Figure 3 features two important factors in the design of
this study, that is, post–error trials vs. post–correct trials
(i.e., triangles vs. circles) and word frequency of the cur-
rent stimulus (including nonwords, grey scales). The plot is
2 In the results section we report bias B instead of z and sB instead
of sz.
3 We also investigated the difference between response repeti-
tions and alternations, as we will explain later on.
4 The analyses reported here concern the difference between
post–correct trials and post–error trials. Results based on the differ-
ence between pre–error and post–error trials yielded quantitatively
and qualitatively similar results. These results can be found on the
first author’s website.
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Figure 2. Cognitive process explanations for PES map on uniquely to different parameters from the drift diffusion model. See text for
details.
read as follows. Each column of points summarizes a single
RT distribution by five quantiles (i.e., the .1, .3, .5, .7, and .9
quantiles—the .1 quantile, for instance, is the RT value for
which 10% of the RT distribution is faster; the .5 quantile is
the median RT). Each column in the right half of the figure
describes a correct RT distribution for a particular condition;
its position on the x–axis shows the corresponding proportion
correct (e.g., x = 0:61 for the post–correct, low–frequency
“freq 1” words). This correct RT distribution has an associ-
ated distribution of incorrect RTs, shown in the left half of
the figure (e.g., x = 1   0:61 = 0:39 for the post–correct,
low–frequency “freq 1” words).
Figure 3 shows that word frequency benefits performance:
high frequency words are associated with low error rates and
fast RT quantiles. More important for the present study, RT
quantiles are slower after an error (triangles) than after a cor-
rect response (circles). The slowdown is smallest in the lead-
ing edge of the distribution (for correct responses, on average
3 ms at the .1 quantile) and biggest at the tail (on average
38 ms at the .9 quantile). These PES effects are more pro-
nounced for low frequency words (frequency groups one and
two) than for high frequency words. Figure 4 zooms into the
PES effect by presenting the data (and the model fit discussed
later) as a delta plot (De Jong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Pratte,
Rouder, Morey, & Feng, 2010; Speckman, Rouder, Morey,
& Pratte, 2008). In a delta plot, the factor of interest—in
this case, the PES effect—is shown as a function of response
speed. Here, Figure 4 shows the average PES effect (i.e.,
the PES effect across all experimental conditions, quantile–
averaged across participants). The delta plot indicates that
the PES effect is negligible for the very fast responses and
becomes more prominent when response times are slow.
For the low frequency words, accuracy is slightly higher
following an error than following a correct response. This
difference of about 2:4% is supported by a default Bayesian
paired samples t–test (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, &
Iverson, 2009; Wetzels, Raaijmakers, Jakab, & Wagenmak-
ers, 2009; Wetzels et al., in press), as the Bayes factor against
the null hypothesis is 52; this indicates that the data are 52
times more likely under the alternative hypothesis than under
the null hypothesis. The small decrease in post–error accu-
racy for nonwords (about :7%) is supported by a Bayes factor
of 10.
Although the post–error effects in Figure 3 are qualita-
tively consistent across different levels of word frequency, it
is not direct how they should be interpreted in terms of un-
derlying psychological processes. The data seem to support
an explanation in terms of increased response caution. How-
ever, attentional effects could also play a role. To understand
the underlying, possibly interacting processes that cause the
post–error slowing effect, we now turn to a diffusion model
decomposition.
Post–Error Effects on Latent Processes
We fit the model to the individual data using theMATLAB
package “DMAT” (Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2007,
2008). As noted above, the size of the present data set al-
lowed us to examine several experimental conditions or fac-
tors. The primary factor was the correctness of the previous
trial, and secondary factors were stimulus type (i.e., word vs.
nonword) on the current trial, word frequency of the word
stimuli on the current trial, and stimulus type on the previous
trial.
For the secondary factors we used the BIC (Bayesian in-
formation criterion; Schwarz, 1978; Raftery, 1995) to elim-
inate excess parameters and select the most parsimonious
model that still gives an acceptable fit to the data. In this
BIC–best model the different factors affected the model’s pa-
rameters as follows: Stimulus type of the current trial was
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Figure 3. Post–error trials are slower and somewhat more accurate than post–correct trials. This pattern holds for all word stimuli but it is
more pronounced for low frequency words (“freq 1”) than for high frequency words (“freq 6”). In addition, the effect is more pronounced in
the tail of the RT distribution. NB. In this quantile probability plot, the y–axis indicates five RT quantiles that together summarize the entire
RT distribution. The x-axis indicates proportion correct; hence, each condition yields two RT distributions, one for correct responses, shown
on the right, and one for error responses, shown on the left.
allowed to affect drift rate v and its variability , and non–
decision time Ter. Word frequency was allowed to affect drift
rate v and Ter. Stimulus type of the previous trialwas allowed
to affect bias B and its variability sB. This BIC–best model
was then used to quantify the impact of the primary factor
of interest, that is, the factor post–error vs. post–correct was
allowed to affect all of the diffusion model parameters.
Figure 4, discussed earlier, compares the data against
the model predictions. The solid dots represent the empir-
ical data (i.e., the PES effect in all experimental conditions,
quantile–averaged across participants), and the lines with
open dots represent the predictions of the best-fitting model
parameters. Overall, the fit is good, except perhaps for the .9
quantile; this may be due to the fact that this quantile is the
most difficult to estimate reliably.
Figure 5 and Figure 7 show the estimates for the diffu-
sion model parameters, averaged over participants. The as-
sociated Figures 6 and 8 present the differences in the model
parameters for post–correct vs. post–error trials. The most
obvious effect in Figure 5 and 6 is the increase of boundary
separation after an error, shown in the upper left panel. This
increase in boundary separation indicates that on average,
participants become more cautious after committing an error.
The Rouder et al. (2009) default Bayesian t–test indicates
that the data are about 180; 000 times more likely under the
alternative hypothesis of unequal boundary separation than
under the null hypothesis of equal boundary separation; this
is considered extreme evidence in favor of an effect.
The post–error effect on bias (bottom left panel) is more
complicated because it was also affected by the stimulus type
of the previous trial. The figure suggests that, after an erro-
neous response, whether this was “word” or “nonword”, par-
ticipants are on average more likely to respond “word” on the
next trial. However, a stronger effect seems to be that partic-
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Figure 4. Delta plots of PES effect against response speed in post–correct trials, separately for all word frequencies and nonwords. Solid
circles represent empirical data (error bars indicate standard errors) and lines with open circles represent predictions from the model. For
both empirical data and model predictions, the effects are obtained by quantile-averaging the results across participants.
ipants have a preference for giving the same response as the
one given on the previous trial, regardless of the correctness
of that trial, i.e., a response repetition effect.
The right two panels show the effects on drift rate and
non–decision time. Neither drift rate nor non–decision time
show any effect of the correctness of the previous trial. How-
ever, with word frequency, drift rate increases and non–
decision time decreases.
Figure 7 shows the estimates for the variability parame-
ters of the diffusion model, averaged over participants. The
associated Figure 8 presents the differences in the model pa-
rameters for post–correct vs. post–error trials. The figures
suggest that none of the variability parameters are responsi-
ble for PES. However, we did find that the variability in drift
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Figure 5. The four main parameters of the diffusion model shown separately for post–correct and post–error trials. Bias B was estimated
separately for post–word and post–nonword conditions. Drift rate v and non–decision time Ter were estimated separately for nonwords and
for different categories of word frequency. The most prominent post–error effect is an increase in boundary separation. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
 is larger for words than it is for nonwords, replicating an
earlier lexical decision study (Dutilh et al., 2009).
In sum, the diffusion model decomposition supports an
explanation of PES in terms of increased response caution.
Concluding Comments
What does a man do after he makes an error? Data from
a 1,094,886– trial lexical decision task showed that people
slow down after an error, and a diffusion model decompo-
sition showed that this slowdown can be attributed almost
exclusively to an increase in response caution. This result
confirms the traditional explanation of PES in terms of self–
regulation and cognitive control (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001;
Cohen et al., 2000; Brewer & Smith, 1989; Fitts, 1966; Ha-
jcak et al., 2003; Li et al., 2006; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977;
Shiels & Hawk, 2010; Smith & Brewer, 1995; Tops & Bok-
sem, 2010; Verguts, Notebaert, Kunde, & Wu¨hr, 2011; Vick-
ers & Lee, 1998): that is, people adaptively change their re-
sponse thresholds to a possibly nonstationary environment—
by becoming more daring after each correct response, and
by becoming more cautious after each error, people reach
an optimal state of homeostasis that is characterized by fast
responses and few errors.
Although this explanation of PES has strong face valid-
ity it is entirely possible that other explanations could also
be correct in particular cases. Only by applying a formal
process model can we evaluate the competing accounts of
PES quantitatively. Our results are partially consistent with
those of White et al. (2010b), who applied the drift diffusion
model to data from a recognition memory task and found that
participants with high–trait anxiety responded more care-
fully after making an error (i.e., increased boundary separa-
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Figure 6. For each of the four main diffusion model parameters, box plots represent the distribution of the PES effect over participants.
Comparison with the dashed horizontal line at zero suggests PES effects express themselves only on boundary separation and a priori bias
(after an erroneous nonword response). Boxes contain 50% of the values, whiskers enclose 80% of the values.
tion a following an error). However, the data from White
et al. (2010b) did not show a response caution effect for
participants with low–trait anxiety; in addition, the behav-
ioral data did not show a PES effect, and, moreover, the dif-
fusion model decomposition revealed that for both anxiety
groups, errors were followed by an unexpected decrease in
non–decision time and a decrease in discriminability (i.e.,
drift rate difference between targets and lures). Therefore,
we feel the current study presents a more compelling case in
favor of the increased response caution explanation of PES.
The present study shows that the drift diffusion model can
be used not only to theorize about the causes of PES, but also
to decompose the behavioral after–effects of an error into its
constituent psychological processes. Such a decomposition
is considerably more informative than the standard analysis
of mean RT and accuracy, and we believe that future on PES
can benefit from taking a similar approach.
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